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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes reservation wages and durations of nonemployment for
young blacks and whites. Self—reported reservation wages are compared for
blacks and whites before and after controlling for indicators of labor de-nand
such as received wages, weeks worked, or other personal characterlstics. The
effects of these reservation wages on durations of nonemployment as well as on
subsequent wages are analyzed as well.
The results show that young blacks seek jobs and wages which are
comparable to those of young whites, but which are higher relative to what
young blacks obtain. On the other hand, young blacks appear at least if not
more likely to take specific low—skill jobs, albeit teporariiy. These
reservation wages appear to have positive effects on nonemplcyment durations
and subsequent wages for both groups, and explain up to a third of the higher




East Lansing, MI 48823—1—
I. Introduction and Overview
Total nonernployment is often decomposed for analytical purposes into two
components: the frequency with which spells are experienced; and the duration
of an average spell. The frequency is the total number of spells and reflects
the rate of turnover (i.e., quits and layoffs) out of employment; while duration
reflects the length of timebeforeemployment is gained or regained. While nst
analyses of the youth employment problem for blacks and whites in the past
decadehave stressed job turnover and the frequency with which spells of
unemployment occur, some recent work by Clark and Summers shows that the dura-
tions of these spells are crucial components of observed unemployment rates for
youth and adults alike.
This studyanalyses thelengthy durations of nonemployment spells that
areobservedfor young black males relative to those of young white males,
and focuses particularly on reservation wages as determinants of duration.
Reservation wages are defined as the lowest wages which individuals are
willing to accept for employment, and are stressed in the job search literature
as the key determinants of unemployment duration which are chosen by individuals
on the supply side of the labor rnrket. Of course, labor demand can affect the
durations of nonemployment for young blacks as well; the key determinants on
this side of the market include aggregate demand, skills, and discrimination.
The direct effects of these forces on duration for young blacks and whites are
also considered 'below,asaretheeffects oflowlevels of demand on the choices
of reservation wages for each group.
The importance of analyzingdurationsof nonem,ployment spells and reser——2-
vation wages in studying black youth nonemployment (i.e., unemployment or time
outof the laborforce) can be easily demonstrated. Clark and Summers(1982)
point out thatthe duration ofnonemployment is significantly longer for young
blacksthan for young whites. They alsofind that differences in unemployment
and nonemployrnent rates between young blacksandwhitesprimarily reflect dif-
ferences in probabilities of gaining employment among those without jobs rather
than differences in probabilities of becoaing nonemployed. Therefore, an abi—
lity to explain the lengthy durations of unemployment and nonemployment which
young blacks experience would also an an ability to explain much of the huge
rates of nonemployment for young blacks generally.
As for the focus on reservation wages as a determinant of duration, this
has been motivated by the ccnflicting views on the relative willingness to work
among young blacks and whites which have appeared in recent studies by social
scientists as well as in the popular press. In a few studies, young blacks
appear to be more willing than young whites to accept certain low—wage jcb)
This was found to be true even a'ter controlling for personal and family
background characteristics. But elsewhere the reluctance of young blacks to
accept low—wage jobs which are considered "dead—end" or "menial" has been
stresseth This latter view emphasizes the development of a new consciousness
or a new set of expectations among blacks as a consequence of the Civil Rights
movement ; and, according to this vieI. jobs indicating low status to h1ch
blacks may have been relegated in large numbers historically are now shunned by
younger cohorts of blacks. The role of crime as a superior source of income
and/or status is also stressed in this literature.—3—
Therefore this study analyses reservation wages, as indicators of
willingness to accept certain kinds of work, as well as durations of
nonemployment for young blacks and whites. Two jor issues are considered
0'— here:(i) Potential differences invwages between young blacks and whites; and
(2) The effects of these reservation wages on durations of unemployment for
each. Self—reported reservation wages arethereforecompared for blacks and
whites before and after controlling for various indicators of labor demand such
as received wages, weeks worked, and thepersonal characteristics which deter-
mine them. The effects of these reservation wages on duration of nonemployment
spells as well as on subsequent wages are then analyzed. Some evidence is also
presnted on certain determinants of reported reservation wages, though a
complete, structural del of reservation wage formation is not atteed here.
Thedata used in the analysis are taken from the Youth Cohort of the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLs)andthe National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Survey of Inner—City Black Youth.
There are four remaining sections in the paper. The first section pre-
sents a general framework for the analysis of nonemployment durations and reser-
vation wages which is used to derive the equations that are estimated below.
Some econometric issues which arise in the estinatior1 of these equations, and
thedata used for the estimation are also discussed here.
The second section presents empirical evidence on reservation wages for
young blacks and whites. Summaryevidenceon various self—reported measures of
reservation wages and received wages is first presented. Differences in results
between various reservation wage measures are explained, and some evidence ispresented on the relationship between reservation wages, the characteristics of
jobs which individuals seek, and the kinds of low—wage, low-skill jobs which are
somewhat nore available for blackyouth.Equations in which these reservation
wages are estimated as functions of labor market characteristics and experiences
such as wages and weeks worked are also presented. Some of these equations are
then used to calculate racial differences in reported reservation wages when
controlling for labor market characteristics.
The third section explores the effects of reported reservation wages on
subsequent labor market outcomes for young blacks and whites, such as
noneinployinent durations and wages received on the next job. Some separate wage
equations are aLso estimated for different categories of job ultimately
received. These equations not only estimate the extent to which differences in
reservation wages for blacks and whites explain their differences in
nonemployment rates; but they also show which of the various reported reer—
vation wages havethe st predictive power with regards to outcomes andthereby
testfor the "validity" of these self-reported nasures.
Finally, the fourth section sumirrizes the results presented earlier and
discusses implications for policy as well as the need for further research.
As for the major empirical results contained here, these can be sum—
marized as follows:
i) Reported reservation vases of young blacks for the jobs which they
areseeking as well as the jobs themselves, are fairly comparable to those of
young whites. But after controlling for labor market characteristics of indivi—
dualssuch as received wages and weeks worked, the reservation wages, ofblacks—5—
appearto be high. The jobs which aresoughtalso appear to be nre unrealistic
for blacks than for whites relative to those which are ultimately obtained.
2) Reservation wages for specIfic, low—wage jobs are generally lower
for blacks than for whites, andtheyappear to be more comparable only after
controlling for weeks worked. Both blacks and whites demand compensating dif-
ferentials for jobs considered to be unpleasant or menial.
3) The reservation wages of young blacks for the jobs which they are
seeking have significant positive effects on the nonemployment durations and
subsequent wages. Those of whites appear to have lesser effects on their dura-
tions of nonernployment but greater effects on their subsequent wages thantthose
of blacks. Thus the jobs sought and wages expected for them again appear to be
more frequently realized among w1ites than blacks.
l) Reservation wage for specific., low—wage jobs often have significant
effects on wages subsequently received for both blacks and whites, e.pecially
when the jobs attained are low—wage laborer or service jobs.
An overall picture emerges in which young blacks seek and aspire to jobs
and wages which are comparable to those of young whites, but these are less
realistic for the blacks. Whites with higher reservation wages are therefore
more likely to actually obtain higher wages while their black counterparts are
relatively more likely to gain longer spellsof nonemployment. Thoughthe
blackshesitate to take jobs which are "dead—end" or "menial," this is true of
whites as well. In fact, young blacks are re likely than young whites to
accept certain low—wage and low—skilljobs,but they appear to do so onlytem-
porarily while continuing to hope for better emrloyment. These better jobs—6-
whichare sought by young blacks, and their reservation wages for these jobs,
thus appear to contribute sorwhat to durations of nonernployment, which are
already lengthy because of dernd—side factors.
I. Nonemployinent Durations and Reservation Wages: Models, Jta., and Econometric
Issues
In order to understand the relationship between nonemployment duration,
job search characteristics such as reservation wages and search effort, and
dennd re generally, the following identity is often used:
(i) E(DN)t 1/Pt *p(Ac
where E(DN) is the expected duration of a completed spell of nonemployrnent
beginning in period t; ne,t is the transition probability——i.e., the probabi-
lity thatthe individual will rve fromnonemployment to employmentwithin the
specified timeperiod; P(Off) is the probability of receiving a job offer; and
P(Ac isthe conditional probability of accepting offers that are
received.
The probability of receiving offers for a young black reflects, among
other things, the demand for his labor that exists in the labor market. Among
thefactors which shift this demand are the level of aggregate demand in the
individual'sarea, which includes the business cycle arid the strength of the
local econon; these factors have heen shown to have strong effects on
employmentfor both black andvhite youth.2 A further effect on thedemand for
youngblack labor might be discrimination. Blacks may be as having
fewer skills than whites and thereforemightfaceeater difficulty in
obtaining eployment. Young blacks might.alsohave less access to various kinds—7—
ofemployment than do young whites for the following reasons: 1) Blacks who
live in inner—city areas may have difficulty travelling to work in firms which
have located in the suburbs; 2) they mighthaveless information about ob
vacancies than do young whites; and 3)theymight have fewer "connections" in
firms where vacancies arise. Finally, an individual's actual skills may be an
important determinant of his probability of receiving offers in the labor
market.While the demand shift factors determine the entiai probability of
receiving an offer, the probability of actually receiving one also depends on
the intensity of the individual's search effort.
As for the probability of accepting offers, this depends exclusively on
the level of the individual's reservation wage relative to the offered wage.
Offer wages are embodied in a distribution f(w°) that is conditional onhaving
receivedan offer and that also reflects the demand shift factors mentioned
above. Jobs are accepted only when v0 >rwhere r are reservation wages.
Therefore, the expected duration of unemployment for an individual with search




whereis .he function relating search effort to offer probabilities and F is tie
cumulative distribution function of offered wages.
Thisequation assumes, of course, thatreservationwages and
searcheffort viii remain constant over the entire expected duration of
nonernployuent. If this is not the case, the transition probabilities and
expected durations for subsequent periods viii change and will be reflected in-8-
theobserved durations of nonemployment.
As for expected wages, these are also determined for a given offer wage





where each possibleWvage above the reservation wage is weighted by probability
of receiv.ng it. This weighted sum is divided by the sumofthe weights so that
these weights add up to one.
Having shown how reservation wages interact with offer probabilities and
offerwages to determine expected durations of nonemployment and received wages,
the determinant of reservation wages can be briefly considered. It is fairly
standard in the job search literature to show that reservation wages are in part
determined by the following factors:
(14) wr =r(,f(w),y, d, H)
where y represents an individual's nonwage income sources, d represents his
discount rate, and H represents an individual's time horizon for working.3
Nonwage income raises reservation wages by lowering the costs of nonemployzient,
while greater demand—side factors and horizons raise reservation wages by
raising the expected benefits of demanding a higher wage for employment. Higher
discount rates should lover these expected benefits and therefore lower reser-
vation wages. With regards to the offer wage distribution f(w), it has been
shown that both the ran and variance of this distribution have positive effects
on reservation wages.
This basic rde1 can be extended in a number of ways to rake it re—9--
relevant for white and black youth. For instnce, it can also be shown that, if
individuals do not have rational expectations with regard to offer probabilities
and offer wages, their subjective expectations will deterxriiné their reservation
wages rather than the actual demand side characteristics; and overly optimistic
expectations which slowly adapt over time aiy lead to high reservation wages.
Furthermore, reservation wages can vary across jobs for a particular individual
if the nonwage characteristics of these jobs vary; and if thesenonwage charac-
teristics enter the individual's utility function) Thus the reservationwages
forjobs with unpleasant characteristics may exhibit demands for "compensating
differentials."
Models in which utility is maximizedinsteadof incomealso allow tastes
forleisure to affect reservation wages as well. These models incorporate labor
supply as well as job search factors, andcanbe used to explain searchinten-
sityand labor force participation.5 Thus the reservation wages of pecple who
are not always actively searching can be considered as well.
Finally, these models often imply a declining reservation wage as the
spell of nonemployment proceeds, rather than the constant one assumed above.
This can be caused by a number of factors, which include: declining assets or
flows of outside income; declining marginal value of leisure; adapting
expectations;and systematic search in which higher wage offers are pursued ear-
lier and lower ones later.
Themodels of reservation wage formation and non employment duration
discussed here imply that a set of recursive equations could be estimated
empirically in which the demand for an individual's labor andotherfactors—10—
determine his reservation wage which, in turn, determine subsequent spells of






whereDNt+ is theduration ofthe completed spell of nonemployment from the
(1979) survey date onward and is the subsequently received wage; w1' and is
the reservation at that time and St is a rasure of search effort; and the
are the determinants of the dennd for an individual's labor.
Except for these labor demand factors, other determinants of reser-
vations wages which are listed above are omitted from equation (7) For one
thing ny of these factors which we observe can be considered endogenous with
respect to reservation wages——e.g., many sources of nonvage income which range
fromgovernment programs to illegal activities.The same can be said about
preceding spells oP nonezployment.6 Including endogenous variables as deter-
minants in the ridel would lead either to serious biases or to identification
problems which would hopelessly complicate the analysis. For this and other
reasons, the goals of thispaperare simpler: to compare reservation wages of
young blacks and whites relative to what is available for each, and to evaluate
the effects of these reservations on subsequent wages and spells for each group.
However, certain determinants of reservation wages are examined below in—11—
order to explain differences in responses by the same individual to different
reservation wage questions. For instance, occupational expectations and hori—
zons are considered below through the use of summaryand tabularevidence on
these factors. The effect of nonwage job characteristics are also considered,
since reservation wages are asked for various specific jobs in the surveys us'd
below. Someoutsideevidence on the role of nonwage income is also ientioned
below.
It should also be noted here that Equation (5)isessentially a demand
function; and its identification is achieved in this recursive xdel by having
direct observations of the reservation wage rather than the received wage as the
independent variable in the duration equation. The reservation wage itself is a
function of the expected demand—side determinants of duration and subsequent
wages but not of duration or wages er Se; its exogeneity in Equations (5)and
(6)isthereby assured.
Also, the above equations areestimatedseparately for blacks and whites
in all cases. Racial differentials in variables such as reservations wages,
when controlling for personal characteristics in X.., are obtained by using esti-
mated coefficients from eauations for whites with mean characteristics of blacks
to obtain predicted reservations wages for whites with the same characteristics
as blacks. The differences bteen these predicted asures and the actual ones
for blacks are considered estimatesofthe race effect.
Most of the econometric issues associated withestimatingEquations (5)
— () arediscussed below as the empirical results are presented. But a few of
the rre salientproblemsare briefly mentioned here, as well as the rthcds—12—
used fordealing with them.
For instance,it iscruciallyimportant for a comparisonof reservation
wagesbetwen blacksandwhites that the determinants of the dend for an
individual's labor,represented by X÷.be reasonably complete. Ctherwise, unob-
served characteristicswhich arepositively correlated with wages and employmnt
but negatively correlated with race will bias downwards any measure of the
black—white differential in reservation wages whichattempts to control for
dendcharacteristics.
To deal with this problem, various specifications of equation (7)are
estimated. In some, the reflect a set of specific deternüninats of wages and
employment. These include "hun capital" variables such as age, experience,
schooling, and "Knowledge of the World of Work;"7 background variables such as
householdincome and the presence of a library card at home; and other indivi-
dualcharacteristics such as region, urban residence, and Lmrital status But
since this set is bound to be incomplete, wages on xst recent job or weeks
worked in the previous year are used instead as controls in other equations.
The former can be considered a proxy for offer wages while the latter a proxy
for offer probabilities. Of course, received wages and weeks worked reflect
expected wages and durations which are themselves conditional on past reser-
vation wages. Therefore, these variables are instrumented on the exogenous
X.andappear only as predicted values in equation (7). These predicted values
enableindividuals who would otherwise report wages as missing due tolack of
employment in the previous year to be included as e1l in these estimations.
But since the predicted variables are functions of the same underlying deter——13—
minants,they are too highly correlated to be included together in any equ.tion
and they therefore appear separately in versions of equation CT). The
underlying t were used separately as well forpurposes of identification. The
predicted wages are also used as controls in equation (6) for the offer wage
distribution. Weeks worked are not used here, s.nce wages are conditional as an
offer having been received; proxies for offer probabilities are therefore not
relevant here.
As for equation (5) for durations of subsequent spells, the coefficient
on the reservation wage is likely to be downward biased by the positive correla-
tion of unobserved characteristics with reservation wage measures and their
negative correlations with durations of spells. In fact, this downward bias has
bee serious enough to produce theoretically incorrect negative coefficients on
reservation wages for whites in some versions of this equation. It should also
be pointed out that the source of heterogeneity in equation (5) is the correla-
tion of unobserved characteristics with reservation wages and durations, while
in equation (7) it is their correlation with reservation wages and race. Thus
thecontrols which are appropriate in the twoequations r.y differ. Infact, an
expandedgroup ofX. variables described below are included directly in equation
(5),andthey are the rest successful in ridding this equation of the downward
bias. On the other hand, predicted wages and weeks worked were re successful
in dealing with unobserved racial differences in equation (7).Therefore,the
results reported below are sonetimes based on equations which use different
controls for labor denand; these are pointedout in each'case.
A further source of downard bias in the estited coefficients on reser—vation wages in equations (5) and (6) is the error that y exist in self—
reported reservation wagemeasures.This possibility could have very serious
implications for rrnich of the empirical work presented below, since differences
in mean reservation wages are an important finding which could be undermined if
the self—reported measures are not considered to be valid determinants of beha-
vior. In fact, several reservation wage measures are reported below which give
somewhat different results on relative reservation wages of blacks and whites.
But by estin.ting equations (5) and (6) separately for each of the reported
measures, their effects on behavior can be- tested and their "validity" or rela-
tive degrees of error thereby determined. This is done below in Section III.
Finally, some potential selection biases are considered here. Since
spells of nonemployment observed prior or subsequent to the survey date exist only
for those who were nonemployed at that point in time, past completed spells for
the currently employed and nonemployed are missed Several issues are raised
here. For one thing, AkerlofandMain (1980) have shown that individuals with
multiple spells of nonemployment in a year account for a great deal of observed
nonemployment. The focus here on one spell per person thus abstracts from the
(1970)
issue of rrritiple spells. Furtherrxre, Kaitz has pointed out that omission of
past completed spells could bias the estimated mean durations of spells in
either direction: a "length" bias exists whereby short spells are less likely
to be observed than longer ones, creating an upward bias in mean duration; and
an "interruption" bias alsoexistswhereby only a truncated part of any given
spell is observed, creating a downward bias. The issue is considered below by
comparing summary evidence or current spells with that of past spells that are—15—
calculated from retrospective ei:iployinent histories in the NLSSurveys.
Selection on employment can also bias the coefficients of any of the
estimated equations. Hecknan (1979) has shown that the correlation between the
error term and the regressors of an equation induced by sampling depends on the
correlation between the determinants of the sampling variable and those of the
dependent variable of the analysis. Since individuals with short spells are
more likely to be seen as being currently employed, spell duration can be con-
sidered a determinant of observed employment status; and since reservationwages
are the hypothesized determinants of this spell duration, they are determinants
of employment status as well. Thus the dependent variables of Equations (5)and
(7)arethemselves the determinants of the samples used to estimate them, and
the correlations described above may be quite severe.
To deal with these potential biases, reservation wages of both the
employed and nonemployed for each racial group are presented below.
Furthermore, attempts have been made to use the Inverse Mills Ratio to correct
forpotentialselection problems in certain wage and reservation wage equations
thatappear below.8
Afew other sampling issues will be considered here as well. Students
are onmitted from all estimationsreported belowsince their labor market
experiences often reflect a different set of factors than those of non students.
However, results not reported here show similar ratios of reservation wages to
receivedwages for students andnonstdents of each racialgroupin the NLS; thus
the omission ofstudents is unlikely to be a major source of selection bias.
Thesamples here include some individuals who have not actually searched for—i6—
workin the previous month, since the discussion above indicates that search
theory can be applied to those who are not always actively looking for work.
However, the relevant questions in the NLShavebeen asked only of individuals
who have searched in the previous xnth or intend to search in the comingyear;
those permanently out of the labor force are thus included here.
A final sampling issue here involves the oversampling of low—income whi-
tes in the NLS. Because we are interested in estimating relationships for the
black andwhitepopulations rather than those nonrandomly selected samples; arid
because estimated relationships may vary across income groups; all estimations
below are weighted by sample weights to produce population—wide estimates.
Though this may induce some heteroscedasticitywhich would bias estimated stan-
dard errors, the coefficients are unbiased estimates of population—wide rela-
tionships. The decision to weight the samples rather than stratify them 'by
income was hased on the small sample sizes used below.
As noted above, two major datasets have been used for the estimation of
these equations. These are the New Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey (NLS); and the Survey of Inner-City Black Youth recently conducted by the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
The new LS is a survey of young men and women aged 114 through 21 in
1979. Minorities have been oversampled, creating a reasonable nationwide sample
of young black males with which to work (1380 in total) and which can be com-
pared to young whites (3081 in total). Since low—income whites have also 'been
oversampled., allestimationsare weighted by the sample weights so that a true
nationwide sarip1e is obtained within each racial group.—iT—
Among the variables included in the NLS dataset are reported reservation
vages, search effort in the previous month and retrospective histories which
give starting and ending dates for each period of employment. Also, the 1979
and 1980 panels are both available. Thus, for individuals who are nonempioyed
at the time of the 1979 Survey, durations of sub.equent spells and wages ultima-
tely received on the next job are available from the 1980 Survey arid appear as
the dependent variables of equations (5) and (6).Durationsfor prior spells
can be calculated within each panel. Extensive information is also available on
family background and personal characteristics. Occupations aspired to for the
future and sought currently are also useful indicators of accuracy in labor
market expectations.
The NBER Survey was conducted between Noveber 1979 and May 1980 among
21400 young black men, ages 16 through 214 in the inner—cities of Boston, Chicago,
and Philadelphia. The interviews were limited to inhabitants of city blocks
with at least 70% black residents and 30% of its families below the poverty line
in income. The questions in the survey focused on the daily activities of both
the employed and nonemployed; their family backgrounds, their job search beha-
vior and experiences (e.g., reservation wages, number of rejected offers and
offer wages, time spent and methods used while searching, etc.); their
retrospective work histories for the preceding 12 months; their income sources,
participation in illegal activities; and alcohol or drug use. Its usefulness as
a supplement to the NLS, which will provide the bulk of the black—white com-
parisons, lies in:(i) its focus on orthern, inner—city blacks, who are the
greatest "problem group" with regards to youth employment; (2) the fact that—18-.
ny of the questions used here from the NBER Survey are directly comparable to
thoseof the NIS, after which some were rdel1ed; and (3) other questions in the
NBER Survey are not duplicated elsewhere and probe at the relevant factors in
explaining the black unemployment situation. Thus the two surveys together pro-
vide for a good comparison of young blacks and iites nationwide, as well as an
additional look at a group of young blacks whose employment problems are espe-
cially severe.
II •RelativeReserva pWa es for Blacks and Whites: Coptr2llin for Demand
Characteristics
This section presents empirical evidence from the NLS and NBER Surveys
on the relative reservation wage levels of young blacks and whites. The first
few tables present summary evidence comparing various reported reservation wage
measures with received wages of young blacks and whites. These provide a crude
measure of reservation wages relative to offer wages for each group. The next
few tables present distributions of occupations sought and held by these groups
and their relationships to the reported reservation wages. It is shown the
individuals report quite different reservation wages according to the charac-
teristics of the jobs to which they pertain. Some differences in reservation
wages also appear to result from differences in the formats of the questions
used to gauge them, as described below. The last few tables in this section
show results fromequationsinwhichwages,weeksworked, andothercharac-
teristics areused to control for a broad range of demand—side factors in deter-
winingthe relative reservation wages of blacks and whites.
Tables1 and2 present summary measures on various reported reservation-19-
wagesand received wages in the NBER and NLSSurveys.The first of these pre-
sents xiansandstandard deviations on receivedwages andon reservation wages
for jobs which individuals are seeking or have in mind ire generally; the
histograms presented in the Appendix to this chapter also present the full
distributionson of these variables. The secondtable presents frequencies
onreservation wages for specific jobs such as dishwashing, factory work,etc.,
which were designated in the survey.
The reservation wages presented in Table 1 for the NLS responses to the
question, "What would the wage (or salary) have to be for you to be willing to
take it," which follows the question, "Whattypeof work have you been looking
for?" or "What type of work will you be looking for?"ang those who intend to
seek work in the coming year. The reported reservation wage is therefore for
"job sought" where the latter is allowed to vary across individuals. Responses
are also open—ended in the sense that the individuals could state any wage rates
they wished to instead of answering "yes" or "no" to rates listed in the survey.
The questions were asked of both employed and nonemployed who sought workor
intended to seek work that year, and the questions were asked in boththe1919
and 1980 surveys.
The reservation wages in Table 1 for the NBER survey also refer to jobs
which vary across individuals. One question states, "Suppose you were offered a
job of the type that you are looking for," and then states different travel
times which might be needed to get to and from work. For each time, the indivi-
dual was asked whether or not he would accept the job at $2.50 per hour and then
at rateswhichincreased by .50 each untilonewasaccepted.Thus, unlike theTable 1
Reservation Wages and Received Wages:
Means and Standard Deviations
NLS
ReservationWages:Received Wages: Ratio of Reservation
For Job Sought Most Recent Job to Received Wages
WhitesBlacks WhitesBlacks WhitesBlacks
Nonemployed.,1979-80 4.59 4.47 4.75 4.00 .9661.118
(1.96)(2.21) (2.76)(2.20)
North 4.73 4.51 5.05 3.91 .9371.153
(1.85) (1.77) (2.96) (1.88)
South 4.31 4.45 4.02 4.07 1.072 1.093
(2.22) (2.54) (1.98) (2.45)
Employed, 1979—80 6.01 5.40 5.13 4.26 1.172 1.268
(3.05) (2.95) (2.25) (1.86)
Full Year 6.18 5.29 5.32 4.30 1.162 1.226
(3.06) (2.36) (2.26) (1.88)
Part Year 5.71 5.66 4.76 4.19 1.120 1.351
(3.00) (3.83) (2.16) (1.82)
Nonemployed, 1979 4.39 4.23 4.23 3.85 1,038 1.099




Noneuployed, 1979 4.36 4.20 4.73 4.33
Work in Subsequent Year (1.86)(2.60) (2.37) (2.03)Table I (Continued)




Reservation Wages: Received Wages:
ForJob For Best For Any
Sought Job Attainable Job Most Recent Job
Nonemployed 3.61 3.64 3.40 3.98
(1.26) (1.58) (1.11) (1 .98)
Employed 4.44 4.59 3.98 4.34
(1.43) (1.85) (1.19) (1.52)
Ratio of Reservation Wages to Received Wages:
For Job For Best For Any
Sought Job Attainable Job
Nonemployed .907 .915 .854
Employed 1.023 1.058 .917
Note: Only nonstudents included in both the NLS and NBER samples in all tables.
Total sample sizes are 1599 for employed whites with wages, and 1130 for those
with reservation wages in the 1979—SO NLS. ComDarable numbers are 350 and 491
for nonemployed whites; 567 and 379 for employed blacks; and 329 and 191 for
nonemployed blacks. Sample weights are used in all calculations using the LS.
For the NBER sample sizes are 475 for employed and 821 for nonemployedyoung
blacks. Reseration wages in the NLS defined only for those who sought
employment in the previous month or intended to seek it in the next year. Wages
received in either survey are for those with employment in the previousyear.-20-
NLS version of this question, the one in the NBER surveyused a closedrather
than open—ended format. The "job sought" reservation wages of Table 1 for the
NBERSurvey present the wages chosen at the lowest travel time of 30 minutes.
Another series of questions in the NBER Survey read, "Say that for some
reason you had to get (a job/another job) right now ...whatwould be the best
job you think you could get," "how much per hour do you think you would earn on
that job," and "if you were offered that job tomirov would you take it if it
paid ________,"wherethe same wage rates were used as in the above question to
guage responses. Though one might expect the 30 minute travel time designated
in the earlier variable or the stipulation of "having to get a job right now,"
in the latter to bias the responses in various ways, they were generally quite
similar to each other, -
Afinal question appeared in which the respondent is asked to list the
"lowest hourly pay you'd be willing to takeon any jobright now" and these
responsesare also included in Table for "sought job" and"bestjob,"responses
to this final question were open—ended but directly followed the others in
sequence.Allquestions were asked of all individuals, both employed and
noneinployed,in the sample.
Severalinteresting findings emerge from Table 1. Perhaps the most
striking is that the reported reservution wages for jobs sought byblacks in the
NLSare similar to those reported by whites in an absolute sense, but they are
generally higher relative to their previously or currently received wages than
are those of whites. For the total sample of nonernployed the ratio of reser-
vation to received wages is 15.2% higher among blacks than whites. The black—21—
andwhite difference is higher in the North than in the South; but even for the
latter group the ratio remins well above that of Northern whites, who consti-
tute three—fourths of the total for this group.
Of course, we would prefer to have offer wages rather then received
wages for this comperison, but the former are not observed. As mentioned above,
received wages areendogenouswith respect to reservation wages due to the trun-
cation of the offer wage distribution from below by past reservation wages—-the
higher the past reservation wage, the higher is the received wage and the lower
is the ratio of the two. Thus, the ratio of reservation wages to offer wages is
likely to be even higher for blacks. These measures also ignore the lower pro-
bability of receiving offers for blacks and therefore that the level of reser-
vation wages relative to overall demand facing blacks is presumably even lower.
Most of the analysis in this paper concerns only the currently
nonemployed,since only they have the spells ofnonemployment directly or sub-
sequentto observations on reservation wages which we are trying to explain.
But as noted above, selection based on employment creates the possibility that
lowerreservation wage individualswith shorter past nonemployment spells are
beingremoved from the sample, andthatthe magnitude of this effect could
differ between blacks and whites. The evidence of currently employed than among
the nonetployed that is presented below raises the possibility that selection on
employment may be an important source of bias.
Therefore Table 1 also includes reservation and received wages of
employed individuals in the NLS who are seeking or intend to seek new
employment. Since we are primarily int,erested in the effects of reservation—22—
wages on nonemployment durations, the reservatIon wagesof employed individuals
who onlydoon—the—job search andwhohave not beennonemployedin the recent
pastare lessrelevant here. It is therefore usefultodistinguish between
thosewho havehad noneniploymentspells in the previous year and those who
haven'tamong the currently employed. Also, an individual'scurrent reservation
wageis not necessarily unchanged from that which determined his previous
nonemployment spell; but at least the current one provides a useful first
approximation to the unobserved one from the past.
The results show that the ratio of reservationwages to received wages
ishigher for employed blacks than foremployed whites, especially amongthose
who have had nonemploy-inent spells in the previous year. Thus the omission of
these individuals and their spells from the analysis does not appear to induce a
major selection bias with regards to reservation wages.
Table 1 also shows that the standard deviations of received wages among
both employed and nonemployed are generally lower for blacks as well as their
means. Thus the apparently higher reservation wages of blacks cannot beattri-
butedto a higher variance in their offer wage distributions despite the lower
means.
Finally,the reservation wages of the 1979 samples, and particularly of
those who gain employment in the suhseuent year, can be compared to the wages
at which such employment is gained. Although comparisons of such nans provide
no evidence oncorrelationsbetween the two irasures, the comparison is at least
useful as a first step towards evaluating thvalidityandeffectivenessof
self—reported reservation wages. For ifthesereservation wages aretruncating—23-
distributions of after wages from below, we would expect the iran received wages
to be somewhathigherthan the reservaticn wages. In fact, the results here
show this to be true for both groups,though the difference is not significant
for blacks. Thus either the validity of responses or their abilities to obtain
these wages becomes re questionable for blacks than for whites.
Beforenoving on to consider results from the NBER Survey, it might be
usefulto briefly consider the fulldistributions of wagesandreservation wages
forblacks and whites as veil as the summary statistics presented in Table 1.
These distributions are presented in the Appendix to this chapter for the
nonemployed. They show, for instance, that the ratio of reservation wages to
received wages are higher for blacks than for whites at the medians of their
respective distributions as well as at the means. These medians are b.00 for
reservation wages and 3.00 for received wages of nonemployed blacks; and 4.00
and 3.50 for nonemployed whites. They also show that few of the jobs sought
would be accepted at below the minimum wage ($2.90 in 1979, $3.10 in 1980) by
either group, although a sril1 fraction of received wages fall below the minimum
for each group.
Furthermore, the distributions of received wages are re heavily spiked
at the minimum wage for blacks than for whites. If this is true of the actual
offer wage distributions as well, any movement of the reservation wages of
blacks above the minimum will have greater effects on their noneloyment dura-
tions. This is true because a greater part of their wage distribution is being
trunca'ted by the reservation wage, leaving a smaller fraction of the distribu-
tion that is acceptable. By differentiating Equation (2), we thus see thismore—24—
This result is confirmed by estimates
clearly: dPNE/dwr =_f(r)where NE is the transition probability, yr is the
reservation wage, and n is the offer probability. A more heavily spiked offer
wage distribution for blacks ians a higher f(v') for them and thus a larger
effect on transitions and durations.
from duration equations for blacks and whites below which show larger effects of
reservation wages on the durations of blacks. The higher spiking at the minimum
for blacks also confirms the notion presented above that the variance of the
offer wage distribution appears to be lower for them and cannot be responsible
for their relatively higher reservation wage.
Thus far, a fairly consistent picture has emerged in which the reser-
vation wages for sought jobs of young blacks in the NLS are higher relative to
received wages than are those of young whites. However, some puzzling contra-
dictions appear when considering the results of the NBER Survey in Table 1 and
of the reservation wages for specific jobS in both surveys in Table 2. In Table
1, the reservation wages for "sought jobs," "best jobs" and "any jobs" of young
inner—city blacks are well below those of blacks and whites in the NLS, espe-
cially relative to their received wages. Furthermore, histograms on the reser-
vation wages of the NBER nonemployed indicate that a substantial fraction of
youths are willing to accept their sought jobs below the minimum, and that the
median reservation wages are close to the minimum at $3.00 per hour. That the
medians and xians differ quite substantially here is no surprise, given the
spiking of the wage distributions around the minimum and the large right—hand
tails.
Other inconsistencies appear upon consideration of Table 2. This table
presents reservation wages for a listofspecific jobs. In this case the formatTable 2
Reservation Wages for Specific Jobs:
Percentage Willing to Accept




2.50 To5.002.50 3.50 5.00 2.50 3.50 5.00
Sought Job, 1979 .02 .41.70 .02 .40 .67 .01.42 .76
Neighborhood
Cleaning .25 .44.65 .21 .42 .59 .35 .50 .81
Cleaiiing .18 .38 .62 .12 .31 .55 .32 .53 .77
Dishwasliing .17 .34 .60 .13 .28 .55 .26 .47 .68
Factory .22 .46.70 .20 .44 .67 .28 .52 .78
Supermarket .17 .39 .67 .16 .35 .63 .21.50 .78





2.50 3.50 5.00 2.50 3.50 5.00 2.50 3.50 5.00
Sought Job, 1979 .03 .45 .75 .03 .41 .74 .03 .50 .77
Neighborhood
Cleaning .31.55 .79 .31.54 .77 .31.55 .79
Cleaning .36 .60 .77 .33 .53 .68 .39 .65 .83
Dishwashing .36 .60 .75 .36 .55 .73 .39 .68 .81
Factory .35 .71.86 .38 .66 .82 .33 .76 .89
Superrarket .44 .69 .84 .40 .61.78 .48 .76 .89
Received Wage, .16 .60 .82 .19 .60 .80 .12 .5.8.83
Most Recent Job
(over)Tbla 2(Cont'd)
Reservation age for Specific Jobs:
Percentage Willing to Accept




Sought Job .24 .65 .93
Dishwashing .15 .47.85
Factory Labor .26 .61 .93
Supermarket .19 .59 .89
Received Wage, .11 •57 .84
Most Recent Job
NOTE: NL3 saiples arelimitedto the 1979 panel of the Survey,
since questions for specific jobs only appear that year. Only
the noneIployed are included here. Sample sizes are 241 for tne
whites and 160 for those with received wages;for blacks inthe NLS
they are 186 and 90 for those with wages;for those in the NBERthey are 821 and 503, respectively.Reservatjonwages for sought job and received
wages for most recent job have been rescãled from the Continuous to the
discrete form.—25—
ofthe questions is identical between the two surveys, though the list of jobs
considered in the NLSislonger. The question reads, "If you were offered a job
as a ___________,wouldyou accept it at ___________?"Ineach case the wage
rates considered are $2.50, $3.50, arid $5.00 an hour. Table 2 presents theper-
centages of the nonemployed who are willing to accept these jobs at each wage
rate in the two surveys.Since this set of questions was asked only in the
1979 survey of the NLS, responses to the question on sought job for that year
have been resealed to the same format and are presented here as well. The same
has been done for sought job on the NBER Survey and for most recently received
wagesin both surveys.
Several strong findings emerge from Table 2. Perhaps most important is
themuch greater willingness of blacks than of whites in the NLS to accept each
of the specific low—skilled jobs, even though there is no such greater
willingness to accept the sought jobs. This is true among those in the North as
well as the South. It is even true when comparing these reservation wages to
received wages for each group. Among whites arid especially blacks there is a
fairly substantial fraction of individuals who are willing to accept these jobs
at below the minimum wage, even though this was not the case for either group
with regardsto their sought jobs.
Comparisons between the different reservation wage measures for each
group produces some interesting findings. For whites, the cumulative percentage
of' individuals willing to accept jobs like factory or supermarket work at $3.50
or $5.00 is relatively close to the percentage for sought jobs, even though vir-
tually no one accepts their sought job at $2.50. But for blacks, no such con-—26—
vergenceoccurs —thepercentage accepting work remains lower at eachlevelfor
the sought jobs. The discrepancy is strongest among blacks of the South, whose
reservation wages for sought jobs are higher but for the specified jobs lower
than thoseofblacks in the North, Finally, some demands for "compensating
differentials"can be seen amongboth blacks andwhitesin the preference of
eachfor factory or supermarket jobs relative to such unpleasant, dead—end, or
menialjobs as dishwashing or cleaning positions.
As for the NBER Survey, there is greater consistency here between reser-
vations wages for sought jobs andthosefor specified jobs in factories and
supermarkets. The same relative dislike of jobs such as dishwashing is also
evident. infact,reservation wages for sought jobs are lower here than for
jobs like dishvashing. Furthermore a comparison of the reservation wages for
specific jobs between inner—city blacks of the NBER Survey and blacks from the NLS
shows that the absolute willingness of inner—city blacks to accept these jobs is
quite comparable to that of Northern blacks in the NLS. If anything, the reser-
vation wage rates are somewhat higher for the inner-city groups, especially at
the 2.50 mark. In any event, the relatively comparable responses of Northern
blacks across the two surveys when questions were asked in the same formats
indicates the crucial importance of these formats in determining the different
responses received.
To sunrize, results from the NLS show that reported reservation wages
for jobs sought relative to previously received wages are higher for blacks than
for whites, while reservation wages for specified, low—skilled jobs appear to be
lover. The latter result is generally consistent with evidence from the NBEB—27—
Survey, where similarly phrased questions show reservation wages for soecified
jobs ang inner—city black youths to be somewhat higher than those of Northern
blacks xrxre generally. Reservation wages for both grops show a demand for corn—
pensating differentials with regard to jobs considered menial or unpleasant.
The variety of responses to differing reservation wage questions by the
same individuals in the NLS, with their very different implications for black
and white youth job search behavior, make it crucial to understand why these
differing responses occur and which of the reported reservation wages have
stronger behavioral implications with regards to subsequent wages and durations
of nonemployment.
A few different hypotheses will be considered here on the question of
why responses differ across various reservation wage equations, and some empiri-
cal evidence on the issue will be presented. Some evidence on the crucially
important question of which reservation wage measures have re predictive power
with regards to subsequent nonemployment durations and wages received will be
explored in the next section.
The two hypotheses considered with regards to differences between
reported reservation wages include the two major differences between the
questions asked in each case. One hypothesis involves differences between open—
ended and closed formats on questions of these types. All but one of the NEER
questions on reservation wages asked individuals whether or not they would
accept specific dollar amounts rather than asking them to come up with a dollar
figure of their own; and the one question in which this was not done directly
followed the others in sequence. Accordingly, Tables (1) and (2) show fairly—28—
consistent responses to these questions in the NBER Survey. By contrast, the
"job sought" question in the NLS is open—ended while the one for specific jobs
uses specific dollar figures; and the inconsistencies between responses to the
two kinds of questions are zrDlch stronger in the NLS, for whites and especially
for blacks, than they are in the NBER data.
One explanation for this xy be that open—ended questions allow indivi-
duals to confound their wage expectations with their reservations.9 This
hypothesis is supported by the fact that explicit wage expectations were asked
of' individuals in the NBER Survey, and responses to these questions were
substantially higher than responses to reservation wage questions. In fact, the
nean wage expected on the "best job" obtainable by nonemployed individuals in
the NBER Survey is .88,whichis substantially closer in value to the reported
reservation wages of blacks in the NLS than are the reservation wages for sought
jobs reported in the NBER Survey. The fact that inconsistencies in the NLS are
higher for blacks, especially for southern blacks, than for whites nay indicate
either a greater degree of confounding on their part or a greater degree of
expectational error on their part.
Anotherhypothesis about differences in reported reservation wages
involves the nature of the jobs being considered. Reservation wages for sought
jobs allow these jobs to vary between individuals and racial groups. The
distribution of these jobs for each group relative to what they can obtain
could thus 'be an important determinant of reservation wages relative to received
wages for each group. The jobs sought also differ from the specified jobs,
which are primarily low-wage and low—skill positions.-29-
Furthermore, different dimensions of the sought or specified various
Jobs could have different implications for the relevant reservation wage. On the
one hand, unpleasant nonwage characteristics of jobs which might also be con-
sidered menial may- lead to higher reservation wages for these jobs; this appears
to be the case for whites andblackswithin the NLS as well as for blacks within
the NBER, all of whom are more willing to accept factory or supermarket work
over dishvashing or cleaning. On the other hand, jobs sought may command higher
reservation wages than low—skilled Jobs for anumberof reasons. For one thing,
thelow—skilled jobs may 'be regarded as more temporary- because of their
"dead—end" nature while sought or desired jobs may be regarded as more per-
manent. As noted above, theoretical treatments of reservation wageswithinthe
search literature have emphasized the importance of time horizon and its posi-
tive effects on reservation wages; and empirical evidence has shown that tur-
nover rates are higher and employment durations lower in low-wage service
occupations than in other oCcupations)'0 Another reason why sought or
desired jobs may carry higher reservation wages than low—skill jobs is that
higher wages may be regarded as more appropriate and therefore more equitable
than the former. A long tradition exists within the literature of labor econo-
mics that emphasizes the importance of traditional wage norms for Jobs and con-
siderations of equity and relative position with regards to comparable workers.11
An understanding among youththatthese low—skill jobs generally pay lowwages
mayenablethemto occasionally accept these Jobs, particularly if they regard
themas beingtemporaryandifthey need the earnings quicklywhilethey con-
tinue to search or to aspire to longer—term positions for which they will demand—30—
higher pay. Of course, the willingness to accept the low—skill job even tem-
porarily diminishes greatly when these jobs are considered unpleasant or nial,
as is the case for dishwashing and cleaning.
It is therefore quite possible that the higher reservation wages in the
NLS for jobs sought iy reflect the characteristics of those jobs as well as
.confoundingof expectations with reservations. Again, one must askwhythe
willingness to accept temporary jobs would be greater for blacks in the NLS than
for NBER blacks or for whites. It might be, for instance, that the dislike of
dead—end or rnial jobs is the relatively stronger effect for whites and
Northern, inner—city blacks; it might also be that the expectations of the
nationwide (including Southern) groups of blacks with regards to attainable
occupation or pay at those jobs may be xxre unrealistic than those of whites and
of Northern,inner—city blacks. It thusbecomes clear that expectations about
wagesand jobsattainable are an important part of both explanations, although
their implications for reservation wages differ somewhat between the two
stories.
Some empirical evidence on the issues of occupational expectations
and time horizons, as well as their effects on the various reservation
wage measures, is provided below. Table 3 presents distributions on occupations
held, sought, and aspired to at age 35bynonemployed blacks and whites in the
19T9NLS.Distributions for occupations held prior to the current spell of
nonemployment as well as for those found after the spells are both listed. The
aspired occupations represent responses to the question, "What do you hope to be
doing at ace 35?"Table 3
Frequencies on Occupations Sought and Held by the
Nonemployed
NLS
Job at Age 35
Job Previously Held Job SoughtJob Found Aspired to
Not
Specified .318 .451 .504 .560.325 .352 .165 .104
White
Collar .045 .059 .075 .062.042 .110 .529 .556
Crafts—
Operatives .339 .185 .262 .248.397 .248 .252 .290
Laborer
Service .298 .305 .160 .130.236 .290 .054 .050
Note: These are weighted frequencies for the 1979 panel of NLS. JOb
Previously Held refers to 1979 survey while Job Found refers to response
from 1980 Survey for those nonernployed in 1979.—31—
The results show that the distributions of jobs sought and aspired to
are remarkably similar between young blacks andwhiteswhile the distributions
of jobsheld are not. More specifically, blakcs arere heavily represented in
thelaborerand service categories as well as the white collar area (mostly
clerical) while whites are imich nre heavily represented in the crafts and
operative positions. Since the latter categories generally include uore skilled
and highly-paid positions than the former, It appears that young blacks have
occupational expectations which are higher than those of whites relative to what
each group ultimately obtains. This view is also consistent with one presented
over ten years ago by Leonard Goodwin (1973), who argued that the black and poor
wanted work like everyone else but had no Iixans of achieving their occupational
aspirations.
Having demonstrated the relatively higher occupational expectations of
young blacks, it remains to be seen how these expectations affect their respon-
ses to the various reservation wage questions. Table 14 presents reservation
wages of nonernpioyed blacks and whites in the NLS for jobs sought and jobs spe-
cified disaggregated by job sought. As before, reservation wages for jobs
sought appear in continuous form and as the percentage accepting work at $3.50
or less; reservation wages for specified jobs appear only in the latter form.
The results show that the reservation wages of young blacks for jobs
sought increase quite th-araticai1y when the job in question ves beyond the
laborer and service category. The percentage of blacks willing to accept these
jobs at $3.50 or less drops from over 5O when the job sought is from this cate-
gory to 10% or less in other categories. For whites this decline is visibleTable 4
Mean Reservation Wages by Occupation
Sought of the Nonemployed
NLS —B Job Sought:
Craft & Laborer &
Not Specified White Collar Operative Service
Reservation
Wage for





Job Sought .365 .409 .529 .322 .422.371 .495 .813
Neighborhood
Cleaning .383 .558 .539 .430 .515.543 .491 .515
Cleaning .368 .629 .337 .118 .438.592 .344 .669
Dishwashing .344 .645 .303 .413 .317.533 .400 .688
Factory .479 .681 .479 .457 .505.789 .348 .791
Note: Samples are the same as those of Table All means are weighted.—32—
though much less pronounced. Willingness of blacks and 'whites to accept the
specified low—skill jobs also shows some sensitivity to the jobs which they
claim to be seeking. In particular, those who are seeking white—collar jobs are
less Likely to accept specified low—skill jobs than those who are seeking other
jobs. But the differences in these rtasures across the job sought categories
are far less striking than they are among blacks for the reservation wages
attached specifically to jobs sought.
This fact becomes even clearer when one compares reservation wage
measures within each category of ob sought. Generally, those who seek laborer
or service employment have comparable or lower reservation wages for these
sought jobs than for the specified low—skill jobs. But ang blacks, those who
seek other jobs have higher reservation wages for sought jobs than for specific
ones. It is clear, then, that the jobs which the black nonemployed seek affect
their reservation wages for these positions, although xny of them who are
seeking skilled blue—collar or white—collar jobs at higher wages seem willing to
accept the specified low—skill sobs at lower wages.
The hypothesis that blacks will accept lower wages for the specified
jobs because they regard them as being rre temporary cannot be tested directly,
but the latter part of the statement can be demonstrated on its own. The NBER
Survey included questions about individuals' intended time horizons for their
most recently held jobs. One question asked, "Did/Do you regard this job as
being long—term or temporary?" while another asked, "How long did/do you intend
to stay on this job?" Respcnses to these questions are presented for the dif-
ferent occupational groupings in the NBER sample in Table 5.Turnoverrates,Table 5
Time Horizons and Turnover Rates for Jobs
By Occupation
Crafts &




Long—Term .39 .40 .29
Temporary .53 .56 .65




< 3 months .14 .14 .19
3—6 months .08 .12 .10
6—12 months .02 .03 .04
Indefinite .67 .66 .56
Turnover Rates .64 .66 .72
Note: Calculations are done for all who had employment in previous year.
Turnover rates defined as percentage of all with employment who
lost or left their jobs in the previous year.—33-
definedas the percentage of individuals who los or leftjobsin the previous
year, are also presented for these groupings. As expected, the results show
that laborer and service jobs are re often-regarded as being temporary by
those who hold them than are other jobs; and intended employment durations are
shorter as well. The xre objectively defined turnover rates also show higher
rates of uvement out of (and therefore shorter employment durations in) these
jobs. The evidence is thus consistent with the claim that black individuals nay
be less choosy about certain low—skill jobs than they are about others which
they are seeking because they often expect the former to be temporary.
Of course, none of this demonstrates that the responses to the open—
ended reservation wage questions for sought jobs in the NLS are truly reser-
vations as opposed to just expectations about wages. It remains to be shown
which of the reservation wages listed here have greater predictive power with
regards to subsequent durations of nonemployment and wages received. This issue
will be addressed in Section III.
For now, it has been shown above that reservation wages for jobs sought
by young blacks are higher relative to wages they ultimately receive than are
those of young whites; while the reported reservation wages of blacks for speci-
fic low—skill jobs appears to be lower. The comparisons between means (or
frequencies) of reservation wages and received wages are a crude first attempt
to judge the level of reservation wages of young blacks and whites relative to
the potential offer wages of each group in the labor rket, where the latter
is a reflection of the derand for labor facing each group. However, such compariscris
are of limited usefulness here. For one thing, they control cnly for offer—34—
wages but notfor offer probabilities. Since black—white wage differentials
have declined in recent years while employment differentials have risen,
omittingthe latter from the controls is likely to demand bias estimated black—
white differentials in reservation wages. Furthermore,the endogeneity of
received wages withrespect to reservation wages is also likely to bias downward
anymeasure of the latter relative to the former. This bias may be compounded
by the omission from the sample of those without any employment in the previous
year, a state which may have been caused for some by their high reservation wages.
On the other hand, the ratio of reservation to received wages may not be
constant across all individuals within each racial group. In particular, if
this ratio declines as received wages rise, the ratio of the means for whites
may understate the true ratio among whites whose characteristics are comparable
to those of blacks. Thus the black—white differential in this ratio will
reflect an upward bias as well; and the net effects of these downward and upward
biases are unclear.
Therefore, different specifications of Equation (7) above have been
estimated for blacks and for whites, and they have 'been used to calculate racial
differences in reservation wages in the following manner:
=- WB = —
wheretheare the estimated coefficients of Equation (7) and the X are either
predicted wages, weeks worked, or their underlying determinants which are
descibed in Section i.12
The equations used to predict wages and weeks worked appear in Table A.l
ofthe Appendix. Theequations presented there wereestimated using OLS and-.35—
includedboth currently employed and nonemployed individuals in the sample. Due
tothe large number of individuals without wages or work in the previousyear,
some equationswere estimated uzing the inverse of the Mills ratio calculated
from probit equations for employment in the previous year. However, the coef-
ficients on this variable proved to be highly sensitive to what wasincludedin
the first stage probit equation and predicted wage values were unstable and
often implausible?3
Table 6 presents the results of simple reservation wage equations on
predicted wages or predicted weeks worked in the NLS surveys. Some equations
contain the continuous reservation wage for sought sobs as the dependent
variable, while others contain a dwrmyvariablefor whether or not the sought or
specified jobs would be accepted at $3.50 per hour. The latter results are frcm
equations which have been estit'ated as linear probability models. Most of
these equations within the NLS have been estimated separately by region; these
disaggregated results on the merged 1979 and 1980 sample for the continuous job
sought variable are presented as well here.
The results of Table 6showthat the reservation wages of whites are
consistently more responsive to demand side factors than are those of blacks.
The differences exist with regard to both wages and weeks worked and in reser
vation wages for both sought andspecifiedjobs. Most of the observed differen-
ces are reasonably significant as well.'5 The regional breakdown shcws that the
lower responsiveness is primarily a characteristic of blacks in the South, but
regional breakdowns on the 1979 NLS sample, though not presented here because of
very small sample sizes for Southern whites, also show smaller coefficients forTable 6
Coefficients from
Simple Reservation Wage Equations






Wages Weeks Worked Wages Weeks Worked
Note: Separate equations estimated for wages and weeks worked. Independent
variables are predicted values based on equations which are presented in the
Appendix. Equations for the NLS are weighted by the sample weights. Only the
nonemployed are included in samples for reservation wage equations, while wage
and weeks worked equations included both the employed and nonemployed.
Continuous reservation wage and predicted wage variables appear in logs.
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Northernblacks than for Northern whites with regards to several of the spe-
cified occupations.l6
Table7showsthe calculated racial differences in reservation wages
using coefficients of whites from equations in Table 6,aswell as those from
equations where the X. variables were directly entered into the reservation wage
equation. For the sake of comparison, racial differences in nan reservation
wages and in the ratios of reservation to (predicted) received wages are
included in the table as well.
The results of this table show that the reservation wages of young blacks
for sought jcbs are higher than those of whites when controlling for wages and
weeks worked. This result appears to reflect the greater responsiveness of
reservation wages amont whites to wages and weeks worked, as well as the lower
levels of these variables for blacks. The weeks worked control produces a
larger effect than the one for wages, since the racial difference in weeks
worked is larger than that in received wages; predicted values for both are
shown in Table A.2 of the Appendix. This table also shows mean values of the
underlying X variables for blacks and whites. As is apparent from line 2 of
Table 7,theracial differences in these variable and their effects on reservation
wages were not strong enough to produce a racial differential in reservation
wages when these variables were used as the controls.
The results also show that the racial differential inferred above from
simply comparing nan reservation to received wages for each group is virtually
identical to the one obtained from an equation controlling for weeks worked. It
thus appears that the various downward biases discussed above in estiting theTable 7




Sought Job, 1979—80 Sought Job, 1979
Total North South Total
Black—White Differences
1. Differences in Means, —.013 —.031 .051 —.042
No Controls
2. Controlling for —.007 —.018 —.018 —.041
Exogenous Determinants
of Wages andWeeksWorked
3. Controlling for Wages .094 .098 .092 .089
4.Controlling for Weeks .134 .133 .155 .149
Worked
5. Ratio of Mean Reservation .135 .176 .104 .149
Wages to Received Wages
Percent Accepting Wages$3.50 in 1979 for:
Sought Neighborhood
Jobs CleaningCleaning Dishwash Factory
1. Differences in Pecentages, .015 .076 .194 .279 .227
No Controls
2. Controlling for Exogenous .006 .053 .150 .203 .219
Determinants of Wages and
WeeksWorked
3. Controlling for Wages —.134 .024 .081 .088 .099
4. Controlling for Weeks —.167 —.025 —.041 —.108 .013
Worked
Note: All differences are between blacks and whites,respectively.Mean
received wares and weeks worked in all cases reflect predicted values here,dua
to large nurnbers of missing values for the actual variables. All means and
equations are weighted. Coefficients from equations for whites are used along
with mean black wages,weeksworked ,orcharacteristics to predict reservation
wagesforwhites when controlling for these characteristics.—37—
racial differential though the means are almost exactly counterbalanced by the
upward bias of using a constant ratio of reservation to received wages for whi-
tes (a notion rejected by the coefficients on wages for whites in Table 6, which
are significantly less than one).
As for the results on reservation wages for specific jobs, these remain
generally lower for blacks than for whites even when controlling for wages. But
when controlling for weeks worked, the willingness of young blacks and whites to
accept these jobs become more comparable. In the case of dishwashing, the
control for weeks worked actually produces lower reservation wages for whites.
This appears to reflect the especially strong responses to wages and weeks
worked of the reservation wages of whites for this job.
To sum up, then, the reservation wages of young blacks fcr jobs sought
are comparable to those of young whites in an absoli.ite sense; but they are
higher for the former after controlling for wages on weeks worked. The same
appears to be true of the jobs sought by young blacks. On the other hand,
reservation wages for specific low—skill jobs are generally comparable or lower
for blacks, even after controlling for these factors. It remains to be seen how
the various reservation wage measures affect the nonemployed durations and sub-
sequent wages of each group.
Before moving on to this issue, a final note should 'be added concerning
the determinants of the relatively high reservation wages of blacks. While some
sumry evidence has been presented above on the roles of occupational expec-
tations and characteristics, none has been presented on the role of nonwage
income which is central to most job search and labor supply models.38
But evidence presented elsewhere shows that reservation wages and nonwage
income are positively correlated for young blacks in the NBER survey.16
Furthermore, illegal income is a major source of nonwage income for this
sample; and Viscusj (1983) shows that participation in illegal activitIes is
negatively correlated with perceived labor market opportunity for this
group. Thus, the outside income generated by illegal activities (and other
sources) for low—skill young blacks may be an important source of their
relatively high reservation wages.
III. Reservation Wage Effects on Nonetnployment Durations and Subsequent
Wages
This section considers the effects of the various reported reservation
wage measures on durations of subsequent nonemployment spells and on wages
subsequently received using the panel data from the NLS. The estimated
results of Equations (5) and (6) are therefore presented and discussed below.
Before moving to these results, Table 8 presents summary evidence on the
durations of nonemployment spells for blacks and whites in the NLS sample.
Durations of three types of spells are presented here: 1) The full, completed
spell of all those who are nonernployed at the time of the 1979 survey; 2) the
incomplete portion of that spell which occurred priorto the survey; and 3)
the portion which occurred subsequent to the survey. The calculations
therefore use retrospective employment histories of both the 1979 and 1980
surveys to generate the completed spells for those who were still rioriemployec3
in 1979.Table 8
DurationeofNonemployent Spefla:






TOT 317.26 406.47 .281
(209.28) (211.35)
North 298.97 422.70 .414
(204.96) (215.63)




TOT 156.93 212.10 .351
(126.81) (132.35)
North 147.03 223.91 .523
(124.24) (130.18)




TOT 162.64 195.29 .201
(135.45) (138.67)
North 153.66 200.06 .302
(131.00) (141.83)
South 194.04 190.58 —.018
(147.85) (135.h8)
NOTE: Spells calculated from retrospective employment
histories in the 1979 aid 1980 LS sarveys for those who were
unemployed in 1979. All spells greater than one year in length
are included with a value of 365. All means are weighted using
sample weights. Sample sizes are 241 for whites and 186 for
blacks. Black—White Differenco calculated with durations of
whites as base.39
These results show that the durations of completed spells of
nonemployment are about 28% higher for blacks than for whites, with somewhat
smaller differentials for the portions occurring subsequent to thesurvey and
somewhat larger for those occurring prior to the survey. About all of the
differentials occur in the North rather than the South, though these numbers
should be interpreted with caution. For durations are substantially longer
for Southern whites than for Northern ones. Thus Southern blacks also have
substantially longer durations than Northern whites, who make up about three—
fourths of the total white population and thus are primarily responsible for
their aggregate results. Blacks, of course, are quite evenly split between
the two regions and aggregate results weight both about equally.
Two other points should be mentioned here. First, the NBER results are
omitted here since only the incomplete, prior spells are available for that
cross—section survey. As has been the case before, the calculated results for
this group were quite similar to those of Northern blacks in the NLS.17
Second, the issue of past, completed spells among the currently employed must
again be mentioned here. As noted before, the past spells are more likely to
have been missed at the time of the survey because they are likely to be
shorter. Looking only at spells of the currently nonemployed is therefore
likely to give upward—biased estimates of mean duration, especially when
considering the full, completed spells (which are not subject to the downward
bias of truncation by the survey date). In fact, the past completed spells
estimated from the retrospective histories were substantially shorter thanany
of those presented in Table 8.18 However, this was about equally true for40
blacks and whites. The racial differentials for these spells was also In the
20—3OZrange, and thus the case for a substantial bias in estimated differences
between blacks and whites is reduced.
Therefore, given that the nonemployment rates for blacks and whites in
the NLS are .396 and .196 respectively, the overall nonemployment differential
Is 102%; and differences in durations of spells appear to account for about a
third or so of the noneinployment rate differentials between the two groups in
this sample.19 It should be noted that this is a smaller fraction than found
by Clark and Summers or by Ballen and Freeman, all of whom found duration to
account for over half of nonemployment differentials between young blacks and
whites. The one—third figure can thus be regarded as a lower bound to the
true estimate.
Moving on to the estimated effects of reported reservation wage measures
on these durations, Table 9 presents the coefficients of duration equations
which •take the fcrm of Equation (5) above. The dependent variable in each
case refers to the portion of the completed spell occurring subsequent to the
1979 Survey date, since the reservation wage reported on that date directly
determines transition probabilities and therefore expected durations from that
date onward.2° As equation (5) specifies, the independent variables
include: a reservation wage measure; a dummy variable for whether or not the
individual has actively searched for work in the previous month; and a set of
variables to control for the labor demand factors which determine offer
probabilities and offer wages. This set of control variables includes all of
the detetminants of wages and weeks worked presented above, as well as dummy
variables for occupation, industry, and colective bargaining for jobsTable 9
Effectsof Reservation Wages on Durations of
SubsequentSpells of Nonemployment
Equations for:






























































3. Neighborhood Cleaning 1.02 1.10
3.50
5.00
4. Cleaning 1.91 2.09
3.50
5.00
5. Dishwashing 1.91 .33
3.50
5.00




Note: Separate equations estimatedfor each reservation wage measure.F-Values
are for pairsofdummies indicating willingness to work at givenwages. Sample
includesall those nonernpioyed in the1979panel of the NLS.Controlsinclude a
dummyvariablefor seach in the previous nonth;allof the determinants of wages
and weeks worked used above; and also dummies for occupation, industry and
collective bargaining. Missing values on these latter variables are given zero
values and special dummy variables which take on values of one. All equations
are weighted using sample weights. Sample sizes are 170 for whites and 129 for
blacks. Durationsofspells and continuous reservation wages are in logs.
Means of the dependent variables on the total samples are 4.412 fcr whites and
4.738 for blacks.
F .0541
occurring prior to 1979. Individuals without employment in the previousyear
vere given zero values on these variables and values of one on dummy variables
for missing values.21 Other specifications of thisequation using the more
limited set of demand determinants or using predictedwages or weeks worked
were estimated as well. But these controls were generally insufficient to
overcome the downward bias due to omitted personal factors on the reservation
wage coefficients22, and theoretically incorrect negative coefficients
appeared in these equations for whites. Results for blacks were far more
robust with respect to the controls used.23
Two other features of the results presented in Table 9 (as wellas in
Tables 10—12 for subsequent wages) are noted. Separate durationequations are
estimated for each reservation wage measure. These measuresappear in both
continuous and discrete form for the job sought; and in discrete formonly for
specified jobs. The discrete forms appear as a pair of dummy variables, which
reflect willingness to accept work at 3.50 or less and atgreater than 3.50
but 5.00 or less. To compare the predictivepower of the different
reservation wage measures with regards to outcomes, F—statisticsare presented
for each set of reservation wage dummies. Thesecan be compared with the
critical F—values for joint significance at the .05 level for eachsample size
that appears in the table as well.
The results show that reservationwages for sought jobs have strong
effects on the durations of nonemployment foryoung blacks, particularly for
those in the North. Since both the durations and the reservationwage
measures are expressed in logs, the cdefficjents can be interpretedas
elasticities. The results show an elasticity ofover .5 for the nationwide
sample of blacks and as high as 1.8 for those in the North. Theresults for
whites are positive but much smaller and notsignificant.42
There are two possible interpretations for the smallerestimated
coefficients for whites in these equatIons.One, as noted above, is that the
coefficients are downward biased because certain unobservedcomponents of
demand are correlated positively with durations butnegatively with
reservation wages. If either of these correlations isgreater for whites than
for blacks, the resulting bias in their coefficientswill be greater. There
is, in fact, some reason to believe that both correlationsare greater for
whites. For, though these coefficients are notreported here, several of the
observed measures of personal characteristics andfatally background appear to
have smaller effects on duration for blacks than for whites.24Furthermore,
the simple equations of Table 6 showgreater responsiveness of reservation
wages to wages and weeks worked for whites than for blacks.Therefore, if the
observed and unobserved components of demand have similarrelationships to
duration and to reservation wages, we wouldexpect the downward bias to be
greater for whites.
However, another explanation of the lower estimated effects of
reservation wages for whites is that the effect is, inreality, lower for
them. As noted above, the partial effect of reservationwages on durations is
—f(Wr),where itisthe probability of receiving offers and f(Wr) is the
value of the probability density function forwages when evaluated at the
reservation wage. Since the evidence of the Appendix showswage distributions
which are more spiked around the minimumwage for blacks than for whites, as
well as reservation wages which are higher relativeto received wages for
blacks, this would imply a stronger effect of their reservationwages on
durations. Of course, we would expect the offerprobabilities to be lower for
blacks, and it is not clear whit the net effect on the relativemagnitudes of
the partials would be. However, as discussedbelow, it appears that the43
probability of individuals obtaining some kind of job offer (albeit at the
minimum wage) If desired may be quite high even for young nonemployined blacks;
and thus the relatively high reservation wages for sought jobs of young blacks
may have strong effects on their nonemployment durations.
Given the estimated elasticities of durations with respect to reservation
wages as well as the estimated differences in these reservation wages when
controlling for demand characteristics of blacks and whites, we can estiniate
the overall effect of these higher reservation wages on the nonemployment
durations of blacks. The estimated elasticity for blacks of .585, together
with a predicted reservation wage differential that was estimated to be as
high as .135 relative to received wages for each group, imply that the higher
reservation wages add as ruch as 7.9% to the nonemployment durations of
blacks. Given the differences in mean durations between blacks and whites of
28% as reported in Table 8 and of over 30% in the dependent variable of the
regression sample (see Note, Table 9), the results imply that a quarter to a
third of the average racial difference in duration may be due to the
relatively higher reservation wages for sought jobs of blacks.
Since durations of nonemployrnent appear to account for at least a third
and probably over half of the higher nonemployment rates of young blacks than
of young whites, the notion that the reservation wages of young blacks may
significantly add to their nonemployment rates seems supported by the
evidence. Furthermore, the estimated duration elasticity and racial
differentials in reservation wages are even higher in the North than in the
South, as is the difference in nonemployment durations. Although the
estimated duration elasticity for the North seems implausibly high,25 the
effects of thei: reservation wages on their nonemployment rates may be
considerable.44
Of course, these calculations use the highest estimates ofboth the
duration elasticities and the reservationwage differentials controlling for
demand characteristics that were estimated. It has beenargued in both cases
that the higher estimates are the more believableones because others are
plagued by various downward biases discussed above. Still, it should be
pointed out that the effects of reservation wages on overallnonemployment
durations and nonemployment rates for young blacks whichare calculated above
are likely to be upper bounds to the true effects.
A final caveat must be mentioned here with regard to the above
calculations that will be elaborated on below. These calculationsassume that
the elasticities of durations with respect to reservationwages would not
change as the latter themselves changed; but, as the formula for thepartial
derivative implies, the elasticity is itself dependenton the reservation
wage. More importantly, a general decline in reservation wages would
presumably lower the probabilities of receiving offers facing individuals if
the aggregate availability of jobs was less than the number ofindividuals
seeking work. Thus the calculations presented above (of a quarter to a third
of the racial differential explained by reservationwages) are even more
likely to overstate the true contribution of reservationwages to the
aggregate racial difference in durations. The predominance of factors
determirg labor demand in explaining racial differences in durations is
clearly established despite the significant effects estimated forreservation
wages.
Moving on to the discrete measures of reservationwages for sought and
specified jcbs, the results of Table 9 show that the former havegreater
explanatory power than any of the latter with regards to duration for both
blacks and whites. However, the highjoint significance level of the dummies45
for sought jobs of whites masks the fact that the relative magnitudes of their
coefficients are not correct —sincethose with reservation wages above
5.00 have the shortest durations. For whites, only the reservation wages for
neighborhood cleaning have coefficients with sensible magnitudes of which at
least one is marginally significant; for blacks this is true of the
reservation wages for neighborhood cleaning, cleaning, and factory jobs. But
none of these other measures came close to having the predictive power or
magnitudes of coefficients (both relative and absolute) which the measure for
sought jobs hasarnongblacks. The belief that the measures for sought jobs
are lees 'valid' than those of specified jobs because the former represent a
confounding of expectations and reservations may be partially true, but the
strong behavioral implications of the former support the case for their
validity.
Having evaluated the effects of reported reservation wages on subsequent
durations of nonemployment, their effects on subsequent wages can now be
addressed. Consistent with the notion shown above that received wages reflect
a probability—weighted average of an offer wage distribution truncated by
reservation wages, Equation (6) specifies that subsequent wages be estimated
as a function of reservation wages and predicted wages, where the latter
proxies for the mean of the offer wage distribution.
Table 10 presents the results of these equations for blacks and whites.
The reservation wages for sought and specified jobs appear in the same format
as in the duration equations, with separate equations and F—values presented
for each measure, hile the predicted wage is the same as that described
above. The results show very significant effects of reservation wages for
sought jobs on the received wages of both blacks and whites. The effect is a
bit stronger for whites, and for bothgroups the effects in the North areTable 10
























































































Note: Separate equations estimated for each reservation wage measure. F—Values
are for pairs of dummies indicating willingness to work at given wages. Sample
includes all those nonemployed in the 1979 panel of the NLS who reportedwages
for jobs obtained in the subsequent year. Predicted wages are included as a
control variable. All equations are weighted by sample weights. Samples sizes
are 143 før whites and 99 for blacks. Continuous reservation wages and received
wages are in logs.•46
greater than in the South. In this equation, the effects of omitted
components of the predicted wage should have a positive rather than negative
effect on the estimated coefficients for reservation wages (since these
components should be positively correlated with both reservation and received
wages); and these effects could be causing the higher coefficient for whites
observed here.
But an alternative explanation is that whites are more likely to obtain
their sought jobs than are blacks, and hence their reported reservation wages
for these jobs have more predictive power with regards to subsequent wages.
This explanation is consistent with the results of Table 3 which show a
greater consistency between occupations sought and those received or held for
whites. It is also consistent with the higher estimated effects of these
reservation wage measures on the nonemployment durations of blacks, which
imply that their higher reservation wages relative to offer probabilities and
offer wages often lead to higher nonemploymerit rather than higher wages for
blacks.
Comparing the reservation wages for sought and specified jobs in their
discrete forms, we find that the former totally dominate all of the latter for
whites, In both magnitudes of coefficients and F—values. For blacks, the F—
values for sought jobs are a little lower than those for neighborhood cleaning
and dishwashing jobs; but the magnitudes of the coefficients for sought jobs
are very similar to those for neighborhood cleaning and are greater than those
for dishwashing (though their standard errors are greater). Thus the
reservation wages on sought jobs do as well o better as those for specified
jobs among both blacks and whites in explaining subsequently received wages;
again, doubts about the validity of this measure are not supported by its
strong ability to explain observed behavior. But the fact that reservation47
wagesfor specified, low—skill jobs have relatively greater predictive power
forthe wages of blacks than of whites again suggests that blacks are more
likely to have to accept these jobs in place of their preferred ones, even if
onlytemporarily.
Inan attempt to test for whether or not the explanatory power of the
reservation wage measures for different jobs vary according to the nature of
the job ultimately received, the same wage equations were estimated for two
subsamples of blacks and whites: those whose jobs found were in the laborer
and service category; and those whose jobs found were in the same broad
category (i.e., white—collar, craft and operative, or laborer and service) as
their job sought. It was hypothesized that reservation wages for sought jobs
should have relatively more explanatory power in the latter group while those
for the specified, low—skill jobs should do relatively well in the former.
The tests are rather crude because of the broadly—defined nature of the
occupational aggregates and because of the much smaller sample sizes in the
subsamples. Nonetheless, the tests were moderately successful, especially
among whites. Table 11 shows the results for the group with laborer and
service jobs. The results show a strong increase in the explanatory power of
reservation wages for dishwashing and for cleaning among whites with a strong
decline in those for jobs sought relative to the results for the total
sample. Among blacks the changes are less pronounced, but there is a strong
increase in the explanatory power of reservation wages for factory jobs. As
for the results in Table 12 for those who obtained the kinds of jobs which
they sought, the reservation wages for these jobs continue to have strong
explanatory power among whites while those for the specified low—skill jobs
have very little here. Among blacks the strongest decline is in that for
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at Subsequent Jobs —Laborersand Service Workers
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Note: Separate equations estimated for each reservation wage measure. F—Values
are for pairs of duramies indicating willingness to work at given wages. Sample
is subset of that for Table 10 and includes only those who obtained jobs as
laborers and service workers in subsequent year. Sample sizes are 64 for whites
and 47 for blacks. Continuous reservation wages and received wages are in logs.Table 12
Effects of Reservation Wages on Received Wages at
Subseauent Jobs —ForThose Obtaining Jobs Sought
Equations for:
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Note: Separate equations estimated for each reservation wage measure. F-Values
are for pairs of duamies indicating willingness o work at given wages. Sample
is subset of that for Table 10 and includes only those who obtained jobs that
they wereseekingin subsequent year. Sample sizes are 40 for whites and23for

















the other reservation wages for specified jobs actually increase.
To summarize, the reservation wages reported for sought jobs in the NLS
have a large, significant effect on the duration of nonemployment for blacks
and on subsequent wages for both blacks and whites. Reservation wages for the
specified, low—skill jobs also have some effects on subsequent wages,
particularly among those who obtain laborer and service jobs, and this is
generally more true of blacks than of whites.. The notion that reported
reservation wages for sought jobs in the NLS are less valid than the others
because the open—ended format of the questioning allowed confounding of
expectations and reservations is not supported here, given the stronger
behavioral implications of these measures. If anything, the results here
suggest that young blacks truly aspire to the sought jobs and the reservation
wages reported for them, and therefore these measures appear to contribute
more to their nonemployment durations than do those for low—skill jobs.
Perhaps the latter jobs are temporarily accepted only when the need for income
is great or the spell has been quite long.
A final issue which needs to be addressed here is that of overall job
availabIlity for young blacks. The large observed effects of reservation
wages for sought jobs on nonemployment durations of this group seem to imply
that a reduction in the mean level of these reservation wages would reduce
mean nonemployment durations and nonemployment rates. As noted abc.ve, the
large estimated effects have the economic interpretation that offer
probabilities are high with regard to lower wage jobs for nonempioyed blacks,
i.e., that jobs are relatively available to those who want them or who are
willing to accept them at lower wages. Neelless to say, this is a fairly
controversial implication for a corunity of young blacks with such high rates
of nonemployment. Before this strong implication Is accepted, two 4uestions49
should be asked:1) Is there other evidence of job availability which ismore
direct than simply drawing inferences from estimated durationelasticities?
2) Even if these jobs are currently available to individuals whoare willing
toaccept them, are they available inthe aggregate? Or is their only a small
numberofsuch jobs available which Only seem plentiful toparticular
individuals because most other individuals willnot accept them? This latter
statement essentially means that the offer probabilitiesfacing individuals
may depend on the aggregate level of reservationwages, and that the
elasticity of duration with respect to reservationwages may decline as well
if there was an aggregate decline in thosereservation wages.
This may be especially true because the availablejobs (or those with
vacancies) are likely to be concentrated among those wIth high turnoverrates
and which are not among those generallysought —i.e.,low—wage labor or
service sector jobs. Those jobs considered menialor 'dead—end" may be the
most available of all because of the high turnover and therelatively high
reservation wages for these positions. The importantpoint here is that a
general lowering of reservation wages and of the level ofjob sought (or even
of the turnover rates Out of these jobs)rnight substantially reduce the
apparent availability of jobs to those who want them, leavingan aggregate
shortage of jobs to be more salient to thenonemployed.
The empirical evidence which existson these larger issues is not too
comprehensive. Some unique evidence from the NBERsurvey appears in Table
13. The inner—city black youthswere asked, "Suppose you were desperate for
honey. How easy would you say it would he foryou to find a job working
as/at___________?,"andseveral jobs were listed afterwards. The results
from this data indicate that over 70Z ofthe nonernployed youth in the survey
believe that it would be o:ewhateasy or very easy to obtain some sort of jobNBER -Blacks
Working as a Laborer
Working at a Minimum
WageJob
Table 13












at the minimum wage; while for other jobs, such as laborer work, the
percentage is lower (46Z for laborer work). These data indicate that on
employed, inner—city young blacks perceive a fair amount of job availabilIty
at low wages, which is consistent with the high estimated elasticities of
duration with respect to reservation wages for this group.
Several caveats must be mentioned with regard to these results. For one
thing, the NBER survey was conducted in late 1979 and early 1980, which
predated the recessions which have plagued the labor markets for the last
three years. Also, these are subjective perceptions or expectations of what
Is available ——asnoted above, such expectations may be overly optimistic.
Finally, these perceptions are clearly individual rather than aggregate and
tell us little about job availability If overall reservation wages were to
change. Therefore, the extent to which the estimated effects of reservation
wages on durations would hold for major changes in the aggregate remains
unclear at this time.
IV. Conclusions and Implications
This paper has analyzed the relative levels of reservation wages ofyoung
blacks and whites, and their effects on nonemployment durations and subsequent
wages for each. The results have shown that young blacks seek jobs and wages
that are comparable to those of young whites, but which are higher than what
the young blacks ulttmately obtain. These relatively high expectations
contribute somewhat to their nonemploytrent durations, which are already
substantially higher than those of whites. On the other hand, young blacks
appear at least if noc more likely than whites to take specific low—skill
jobs, though it seems that they take these only temporarily. Reluctance to
take certain "menial' dead—end jobs appears among both blacks and whites.51
What all of this seems to imply is that young blacks have ixdel1ed their
expectations and aspirations after those of the white society around them,
although their means of achieving these ends are lower. To what extent the
latter is true because of lower skills, fewer contacts, less information, or
simple discrimination is unclear.
It does seem as though the concern expressed in recent years about a
"Culture of Poverty" among poor blacks, whose main problem is their lack of
middle—class aspirations are to be met.
The results also shed new light on the value of strategies which create
only more low wage, "dead—end" jobs for young, nonemployed blacks in the
public or private sector. To the extent that many young blacks appear willing
to take these jobs temporarily, they may be useful in a limited sense as a
means of providing income or training. But it is clear that young blacks,
like their white counterparts, aspire to better positions than these, even in
the short run. Unless accompanied by substantial training or some other means
of achieving upward movement, public service jobs or private ones created by
policies like a youth subminimum wage are urilikey to meet the hopes and needs
of the young nonemployed.pp end ix
iableA.i










































































































































1,891 1,936 737 832
6.140 41.086 5.953 30.105
Note: Equations estimated using OLS. Samples include everyone reportingwages
in previous year for wage equations and everyone (including those without work
in previous year) in weeks worked euqtions. Household income (exiuding om) in
thousands of dollars. Knowledge of World of Work (Kww) ranges from 1 to 11 for
nunberofquestions answered correctly. Experience reflects number of years in














1979-80 1979 1979-80 1979
Total N S TotalTotal N S Total
Predicted Wages 6.0546.1055.9136.0075.8785.8985.8605.816
(.181) (.157) (.170) (.168) (.165) (.158) (.170) (.I'LS)
Predicted leeks36.222 36.681 34.437 35.788 24.695 22.751 26.528 22.732
Worked (5.687) (5.718) (5.397) (5.497) (7.506) (7.102) (7.415) (6.298)
Age 19.200 19.387 18.677 19.145 19.496 19.688 19.315 19.214
(1.730) (1.610) (1.936) (1.549) (1.694) (1.681) (1.687) (1.565)
Exerience 1.0101.043 .777 .785 .803 .926 .687 .578
(1.152) (1.204) (.950) (1.122) (1.508) (1.123) (.980(.955)
Urban .728 .821 .466 .722 .855 .952 .763 .856
(.445) (.383) (.499) (.442) (.352) (.213) (.425) (.351)
South .263 — .261 .515 — .501
(.440) — (.442)(.500) — (.500)
ICWW 5.5895.7235.2135.6254.7934.8634.7274.953
(1.790) (1.774) (1.780) (1.815) (1.709) (1.699) (1.715) (1.743)
Library Card .806 .836 .722 .809 .723 .692 .753 .712
at Home (.396) (.371) (.448) (.393) (.447) (.497) (.431) (.453)
H.S. Diploma .499 .593 .236 .439 .452 .442 .462 .370
(.oo) (.491) (.424) (.496) (.498) (.s) (.483)
Marital Status
Now Married .051 .053 .046 .042 .073 .036 .109 .071
(.220) (.224) (.209) (.201) (.261) (.187) (.312) (.257)
Was Married .009 .013 .000 .014 .004 .000 .007 .006
(.096) (.iii) (.000) (.118) (.061) (.000) (.085) (.078)
H.H. Income 132491386211374 12503112671233310435 9884
(13005) (13201) (loao2) (11170) (13428) (14506) (11443) (11056)
N 420 300 120 179 296 155 141 141
Note: All means are weightod us-?Lng sample weights. Predicted wages and weeks
worked calculated using renys fron these tables and coefficients from equations
presented in the previous table. Sanplë sizes reflect those for whom reser-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































'Recent work by economists on the reservation wages of blacks and whites
includes a piece using only one of the available reservation wage measures in
the NLS by Michael A. Borus (1982). Using these data, he finds blacks more
willing to work, even after controlling for personal and local labor market
characteristics. A piece from a more sociological perspective which stresses
the reluctance of young blacks to do menial work Is by Elijah Anderson (1980).
2See Richard B. Freeman (1979).
3For an excellent survey of the job—search literature, see S.J. Lippman
and J.J. McCall (1976).
4For a search model based on utility—maximization which allows reservation
wages to vary across jobs, see Harry J. Hoizer (1983).
5See Lippman and McCall (1976).
6The endogeneity ofnonwage income with regards to reservation wages
derives from the fact that participation in illegal activities or government
transfer programs will be affected by employment status which, in turn, may
reflect rese:vation wages. The endogeneity of duration of preceding spells
reflects the fact that an individual's reservation wage may not vary greatly
over tfme and therefore current reservation wages reflect those In the past
which are partly responsible for the preceding spell.
7The "Knowledge of the World of Work" variable reflects the number of
questions out of eleven which were answered correctly where the questions
Involved choosing definitions of specified occupations.
possibilIty was first suggestedto me in conversations with
John Bound20Since reservation wages directly determine transitional probabilities
which, in turn, determine expected duration, several equations were estimated
of the same form as Equation (5) but where the dependent variable was ne' a
dummy variable for transition probability which equals one if the subsequent
nonemployment duration was 30 days or less. Results of this equation were
generally consistent with those of comparable duration equations, though
coefficients were generally of comparable duration equations, though
coefficients were generally less significant in the former. This appeared to
be caused by a greater variation in reservation wages within the post 30—day
spells (which accounted for over 80% of the sample for both groups) than
between the two groups of spells.
21These extra variables were not included in thewage and weeks worked
equations because these equations were estimated for both 1979 and 1980; and
because, in each of these years, the missing value variables were endogenous
with respect to wages and weeks worked. In other words, the missing value
variables were always zero if wages were earned arid were always one if weeks
worked were zero. This problem was not encountered in the duration equation
because the missing value variables for employment prior to 1979 are exogenous
with recpect to durations that ocurred subsequent to 1979.
22The formula for bias on the estimated coefficient of duration would be
bDN,XX*b,,Wr where the former coefficient is the true regression coefficient
on the omitted variable while the latter is the auxiliary regression of the
omitted on the included variable. In this case, the former would be negative
and the latter positive, creating'a downward bias.
23The coefficients for blacks on reservationwages for equations using
predicted wages or the more limited set of demand—side determinants as
contro]s generally ranged from .4 to .524For instance, the coefficients onKWW, household income, and experience
were significantly smaller for blacks than for whites in the duration
equations.
25The estimated duration elasticity of1.8, together with reservation wage
differentials of .176 relative to mean received wages, imply an effect of
.317, which accounts for most of the racial differential in the regression
sample for that region. Since sample sizes were fairly small here (N=71), the
results are subject to some doubt. -References
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